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Far better than sovereignty over the earth, or far better than going to the abodes of the devas, 
or far better than ruling supreme over the entire universe, is the attainment of Sotāpatti Fruition.
The Buddha, Dhammapada, verse 178
A monk once went to Gensha, and wanted to learn where the entrance to the path of truth was. 
Gensha asked him, “Do you hear the murmuring of that brook?” “Yes, I hear it,” answered the 
monk. “There is the entrance,” the Master instructed him.




Ethnographers often work among what I call polyphasic cultures2—that is, among peoples who consider experiences had in alternative states of 
consciousness to be both real and significant. Hence, 
an experientially grounded ethnography will inevitably 
have to incorporate the more transpersonal domains 
of experience, and the realizations and psychological 
transformations that stem from such experiences. 
However, despite such realizations often finding their 
way into cultural expressions as narratives, mythopoeic 
symbolism, ritual enactments and art, the significance 
is often missed due to the lack of requisite transpersonal 
experience on the part of the fieldworker or lab 
researcher. As my colleagues and I have argued many 
times elsewhere, the study of transpersonal experiences 
requires transpersonal methods (Laughlin, 1989, 1994a, 
2011; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990). Simply 
put, if I want to know, I have to do what is necessary 
to know. As Ken Wilber (2005) suggested in his book, 
A Sociable God, one begins the process of inquiry with 
the injunction, “If you want to know this, do this” 
(p. 156). When one does “this” (i.e., meditate, dance, 
take the magic herb, carry out the ritual) then certain 
experiences arise as a consequence, and then perhaps a 
conversation ensues with one’s host or guide, one learns 
what those experiences mean both for oneself and for 
one’s host culture.
In this paper I want to share how transpersonal 
experiences arising for me along a path of spiritual 
inquiry may, in retrospect, be understood as part of 
a single maturational process. I will describe several 
experiences I have had over the course of nearly 50 years 
as a meditator, and roughly 35 years as a Buddhist insight 
meditation practitioner, seven years of which were spent as 
a Tibetan Tantric Buddhist monk. I want to sketch these 
experiences in order to show how one follows the other 
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in a retrospectively obvious and causally efficacious way. I 
will take the reader from my realization of the pixilated 
nature of sensory experience, through the realization 
of the impermanence of the self to the experience of 
what Theravada Buddhists call “stream-entry,” the first 
conscious experience of Nirvana. I offer this description, 
not to replace the necessity of directly experiencing these 
way-points (after all, “if you want to know this, do this”), 
but rather: (1) to sensitize transpersonal anthropologists 
and other researchers to the developmental dimension 
of transpersonal experiences, and (2) to underscore 
the empirical evidence for states of consciousness that 
transcend sensory experience. The terminology I will use 
will be from both Theravada Buddhism and Husserlian 
phenomenology. Although the goals of Buddhist and 
Husserlian phenomenology are different, I am mixing 
their terminology here because: (1) both held sway in 
my own development, and I have used both frameworks 
in making sense of my experiences, (2) both Theravada 
Buddhist methods and Husserlian methods constitute 
transcendental phenomenologies (Hanna, 1993a, 1995; 
Larrabee, 1981),3 (3) both methods are productive of 
good science (Chavan, 2007), and (4) in some cases 
the Husserlian interpretations and terminology are 
less loaded with ideological baggage than are Buddhist 
accounts.
Learning To Meditate
I was originally taught to meditate by one of my professors, the late Dr. LeRoy Johnson, while doing graduate 
work in anthropology at the University of Oregon in 
1967. LeRoy showed me how to sit in half-lotus position 
and focus attention on the rising and falling of my belly. 
I quickly learned that with increasing concentration 
to the exclusion of distractions (other objects, verbal 
chatter, etc.) came a deeper and deeper calm leading to 
single-minded bliss-states I would later learn were typical 
of absorption states (samādhi, jhāna; see Gunaratana, 
1988; Snyder & Rasmussen, 2009), and that the practice 
was in fact samatha—cultivation of single-mindedness 
leading eventually to a special state of complete calm and 
one-pointed concentration that Buddhists call upacara 
samādhi, or “access concentration,” so named because 
the mind is free to choose to concentrate upon an object 
or remain indifferent to the object, and thus may choose 
to enter absorption states or not. 
But I am getting ahead of my story. At the time I 
learned to easily enter samādhi using belly concentration, 
I knew nothing about Buddhism or insight meditation, 
and simply meditated to relax and enter bliss-states as 
a palliative to the rigors of graduate school. I became 
adept at what I later understood was, from the Buddhist 
point of view, frozen-ice samādhi—frozen, because the 
state of mind is utterly devoid of any burning questions 
that would lead to any insight into the nature of mind. 
Inevitably, I grew bored with bliss-highs and dropped 
meditation work for the following decade or so.
When I took up meditation again, it was because 
I was having experiences that triggered avid questions 
about consciousness. A years-long process of unfolding 
dream-work that I have described in detail elsewhere 
(Laughlin, 2011, pp. 409–421), accompanied by taking 
up hatha yoga practice, lead eventually to spontaneous 
transpersonal experiences and serious questions about 
mind that had been absent from my earlier so-called 
frozen ice attitude. I sought and found guidance from 
Buddhist teachers4 in Canada under whose tutelage I 
learned the causally entangled relationship between 
tranquil single-mindedness (samatha) and mindfulness 
(or vipassana; see Goleman, 1984; Solé-Leris, 1986; 
Thanissaro, 1997; Johansson, 1969. pp. 88–102S). It 
was during lengthy meditation retreats, ostensibly under 
the influence of Buddhist methods and guidance, that 
I learned to establish what Edmund Husserl (1989) 
liked to call the phenomenological attitude—that is, the 
suspension of everyday conditioned interpretations of, 
reactions to, and beliefs about the world and the self (i.e., 
the natural and personal attitudes) and the cultivation of 
a series of epochés 5 that allows the contemplative to study 
aspects of consciousness through direct introspection 
(Husserl, 1931; Kockelmans, 1967; Miller, 1984; Schmitt, 
1959). This shift in consciousness is not a momentary 
choice, but involves a fundamental reorganization 
of perception with life-long consequences. Arthur 
Deikman (1982) has argued that mature contemplation 
involves a process of deautomatization, “an undoing of 
the automatic processes that control perception and 
cognition” (p. 139)—a freeing-up, as it were, of natural 
attitude conditioning requisite to the development of 
the phenomenological attitude.
Any discernable attribute of consciousness 
may be bracketed, deautomatized, and studied using 
mindfulness methods. For instance, one may choose 
to isolate the color red and study the gradation of hues 
cognized as red, or the feelings evoked by reddish 
hues. Or, one may choose to bracket the relationship 
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between visual patterns on a page and the meaning they 
evoke as words. Wine tastings under a sommelier are 
essentially phenomenological exercises leading to a more 
sophisticated understanding of the flavorful nuances of 
wine. The potentially bracketable qualities and processes 
of experience are virtually endless. However, some foci 
are more auspicious than others, depending upon the 
goal or ideology associated with the meditation being 
practiced. In Buddhist psychology, focusing upon the 
impermanence of phenomena is more important and 
developmentally productive than focusing upon discrete 
qualia. In Husserlian terms, this whole process of self-
inquiry is called phenomenological reduction (Held, 
2003, p. 21), the intent of which is to learn to parse raw 
sensory presentation (the things themselves) from knee-
jerk interpretation.
As any seasoned meditator will attest, all sorts of 
strange sensory experiences arise during the maturation 
of contemplation. Many of these experiences are what 
Buddhist psychology calls signs (nimitta), some of which 
are what may be called countersigns (patibhaganimitta) 
for the particular meditation object upon which one is 
focused (see Buddhaghosa, 1991; Laughlin, McManus, 
& Webber, 1985; Snyder & Rasmussen, 2009, pp. 57–
63). Regardless of the object of concentration (breath, 
heartbeat, water, flame, sensations arising from the soles 
of the feet, kasin.a practice6, so forth), eventually most 
meditators will experience imagery that is associated 
with that object. For instance, many who meditate 
upon the breath moving in and out of the nostrils see 
bubbles of one sort or another (“fish eggs,” “bubble 
wrap,” so forth). Meditation on other objects may 
result in intricate lacy patterns, smoke, various light 
phenomena, and so forth. These are the countersigns 
of the object of consciousness. They are causally and 
unconsciously associated with the object, but are not 
logically predictable from the object. Objects are 
associated with numerous countersigns, and these 
countersigns tend to indicate stages in the development 
of the meditation. Every Zen koan has its countersign(s) 
and by reporting these to the teacher will determine 
where the meditator is along the path of contemplative 
maturation. Frequently, the arising of countersigns are 
interpreted by meditators as transpersonal experiences. 
Viewed in this way, the range of transpersonal 
experiences had by a serious practitioner over time may 
be considered as way stations along a maturing spiritual 
path.
If, instead of remaining focused on the original 
object (breath, eidetic image, sensations at the bottom of 
the feet in walking meditation, etc.), the meditator shifts 
focus to the countersign, applying sufficient intensity of 
concentration may lead to absorption ( jhāna) into the 
sign—that is, the collapsing of the watching-watched 
(subject-object) duality. Absorption is a natural function 
of an interested brain. One normally experiences 
absorption when watching a movie in a cinema, or while 
engrossed in a good book. But the kind of absorption 
I am describing here is into an image produced wholly 
within the mind’s eye. Moreover, the concentration 
may well be beyond the intensity one normally brings 
to reading or watching a film. In addition, the sign is 
usually simple and not very dynamic. Again, the sign 
is associated with the original object—it is a sign of the 
object.
Absorption states are frequently numinous, 
especially for beginning meditators. Among other 
things, the jhānas are often accompanied by bliss (pīti) of 
varying intensities, dynamics and locations in the body. 
Meditators may describe themselves as feeling a frisson, 
a “rush,” joyous, centered, exhilarated, pleasurable, 
ecstatic, and so forth. The loci of bliss may be in the 
so-called chakras (energy centers in the body), perhaps 
also flowing up or down the central channel. For the 
duration of the absorption and for a period afterwards, 
the meditator feels good, comfortable, tranquil and 
energized (Laughlin, 1994b). Buddhist meditators 
are taught to utilize these experiences to energize 
their insight practice—like plugging-in to a psychic 
battery—but not to make the mistake of considering 
the absorption state as the goal of insight practice, no 
matter how numinous the experience. When I was 
early on practicing frozen-ice samadhi, I had become 
essentially a pīti-junkie.
Apprehending Sensorial "Dots"
The pursuit and maturation of the phenomenological attitude typically produces a state of mind marked 
by astonishment and wonder—what Zen practitioners 
call the beginners mind (Suzuki, 1970)—and by a 
cognition relatively free of the constraints of received, 
culturally conditioned frames of reference (the natural 
attitude of everyday consciousness; see Fink, 1981). This 
freedom allows the inner-directed study of the factors 
of consciousness as objects of awareness, rather than 
conditioned attention to phenomena naïvely presumed 
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in the natural attitude to be “out there” somewhere and 
requiring response (see Funke, 1981).  The contemplative 
comes to realize that each and every state of mind is 
componential and unitary.  In addition, the contemplative 
can slow the process of neurocognitive entrainment 
down to the very simple so as to discern the atomic levels 
of experience: pixels, temporal epochs, impermanence of 
objects, purity, parallel processes, componential nature 
of the empirical ego, or me (and cognized ego, or I), and 
visible and invisible causation.
This is a very crucial point, for even if one 
has access to the very finest neuroscience available, if 
the phenomenological data remain naïve (pre-epoché, 
pre-reduction, natural attitude laden), it is very likely 
the neurophenomenology will be naïve as well—and 
very likely erroneous.  For example, it is apparent to 
most mature contemplatives known to the author that 
at some point in their meditative careers they came to 
realize that sensory data are pixelated, particulated, 
or granular to perception (Laughlin, 1992; Laughlin, 
McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990).  In other words, there 
comes a time when many contemplatives reach a specific 
epoché within which they are able to perceive that their 
entire sensorium (multimodal sensory field) is made up 
of points (dots, granules, particles, bindus, yods, and so 
forth).  After the epoché, the sensorium is experienced as 
a field of flickering, pulsating pixels that is perceptually 
and cognitively distinguishable into sensory modes, 
and within sensory modes into forms and events.  The 
fundamental act of perception is the abstraction and 
reinforcement of invariant features within the order of 
an unfolding and dissolving field of dots (see Gibson, 
1979). In my experience, apprehending the pixelated 
nature of the senses is easiest to realize visually, but 
eventually sounds, tastes, touches are all made up of 
sensory particles.  Once one realizes this epoché, one may 
easily apprehend the granular texture of the sensorium 
at will.  Furthermore, when concentration upon sensory 
molecular pixels reaches a sufficient intensity, awareness 
of gross sensory objects is lost, including the ego (see 
below).
Whether or not a theorist has attained this dot 
epoché is evident by how they experience and think 
about their own consciousness, and what understanding 
of consciousness they project upon others.  For instance, 
David Chalmers (1996), the Australian philosopher of 
mind, has famously defined what he called the hard 
problem of consciousness. By that he meant, after all 
the mental functions are explained by reference to their 
underlying neurophysiology, the fact of experience 
remains a puzzle. 
Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in 
visual and auditory information-processing, we have 
visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep 
blue, the sensation of middle C? . . . . It is widely 
agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, 
but we have no good explanation of why and how it 
so arises. Why should physical processing give rise 
to a rich inner life at all? (Chalmers, 1995, p. 201)  
Nowhere in his presentation of the “hard problem” did 
he evince the epoché noted above.  He did not seem to 
realize that his patch of “deep blue” is (1) pixelated, and 
(2) a cognitive operation of his own brain.  A patch of blue 
is the brain’s symbolic representation of electromagnetic 
energies striking the retinae and mediated by special 
networks of cells.  In other words, blue dots are the 
brain’s way of representing a specific range of observable 
electromagnetic frequencies to itself.  When one realizes 
that all sensory experience is a cognitive act on the part 
of the brain, then the so-called hard problem vanishes, 
or is at least rendered much easier.
No-Self
Realizing that sensory experience is pixelated, and that pixels and fields of pixels arise and pass away each 
and every moment of consciousness leads quite naturally 
to understanding that all things constructed from these 
sensorial dots are likewise impermanent, including all 
thoughts, images, feelings, somatic sensations, perceptual 
qualia, and so forth. This is one route to realizing that 
everything one is conditioned to associate with the 
ego—the personal or participating self, that which seems 
to be me—is also impermanent. Thus it is not surprising 
that disciplined contemplation will eventually lead to 
the fall of the illusion of the permanent ego. This indeed 
happened in my case. Sometime around 1980 I was 
meditating in a hotel room on the Rue des Ecoles near 
the College de France in Paris when I suddenly realized 
(an instantaneous intuitive insight) that all sensory 
modes are pixelated. Prior to that I had assumed that 
only visual sensations were made up of dots. The “Rue 
des Ecoles realization” (as I have called it ever since) led 
directly to the realization of no-self soon thereafter.
There is no better example of the transformational 
capacity of self-reflection than the realization of no-self 
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(or not-self; see Thanissaro, 1999); that is, the realization 
that there is no such thing as an empirical ego, no 
permanent soul-entity, no little homunculus sitting inside 
the brain watching the sensorial movie. One realizes that 
the belief in a permanent ego is an artifact of cultural 
conditioning that is easily dispelled by phenomenological 
self-reflection—by disciplined introspection leading to 
direct experiences that bring one’s received self-model 
into question. Because the realization of no-self is 
derived empirically—that is, introspectively—it is safe 
to say that any cultural tradition that encourages self-
reflection as a path to self-knowledge and wisdom will 
lead inevitably to apprehending that nothing that arises 
in consciousness is permanent. This realization is not a 
matter of taste, not a matter of opinion or ideological 
commitment, not a matter of cultural custom, but 
rather is one of empirical seeing of the self as it really is, a 
transcendental and dynamic self-system.
Anatta
The best known tradition of self-reflection leading 
to the realization of no-self, and the elevation of that 
realization to a cornerstone of an ethno-phenomenology, 
is the Buddhist doctrine of anatta (also known as no-self 
or selflessness; see Austin, 1998; Carlisle, 2006; Collins, 
1982; Federman, 2011; Flanagan, 2011, pp. 93–98; 
Harvey, 1995; Metzinger, 2009; Morris, 1994; Smith, 
2010; Thanissaro, 1999). In Theravada Buddhism, the 
realization of anatta occurs automatically as a fruit of 
insight meditation (vipassana). In a famous treatise 
on insight meditation, the great Burmese meditation 
master, Mahāsi Sayādaw (1994), noted that the belief 
in a permanent ego falls away during stage four of a 
19-stage maturation process leading to the realization 
of Nibbāna (Nirvana) and its fruits. What Mahāsi’s 
discourse obviously implies is that personal identification 
with an enculturated self-model is common to all people 
everywhere, even in Buddhist societies. This is a point 
that ethnographer Melford Spiro (1993) made about his 
Burmese Buddhist hosts. Aware of the central teaching 
of anatta, he wished to see how that teaching influenced 
peoples’ self-understanding. Spiro noted that:
After a few months into my field work . . . it became 
apparent that I would have to change my research 
plans because I discovered that the Burmese villagers 
with whom I lived and worked do not internalize 
the doctrine of anatta. Instead, they strongly believe 
in the very ego or soul that this doctrine denies. 
They do so on two accounts, experiential and 
pragmatic. First, because they themselves experience 
a subjective sense of a self, the culturally normative 
concept of an ego-less person does not correspond to 
their personal experience. Second, and perhaps more 
important, they find the doctrine of selfless person 
not congenial to their soteriological [expectation of 
salvation] aspirations. (Spiro, 1993, p. 119)
Spiro’s findings among the Burmese mirror my own 
among Tibetan Buddhist monks. Individuals rising to 
the realization of no-self are exceptional in any society; 
even those who’s local epistemology or ethnopsychology 
describe the emptiness of the transcendental self. 
Tibetan Buddhist monks may learn texts by heart that 
extol the virtues of realizing no-self (the anatman), but 
few actually practice the advanced insight meditations 
leading to this realization. Indeed, if the realization of 
no-self were all that easy, disciplined methods leading to 
that realization would be irrelevant. 
No-Self in the West
Practitioners of certain Western phenome-
nological and spiritual traditions have reached the same 
realization based upon meditations focusing upon the 
impermanent contents of the empirical ego. The great 
phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, concluded from his 
own introspection that the ego is essentially empty of 
content and is really no more than an enduring point 
of view upon ever-changing content—a transcendental 
ego as Husserl liked to say, tongue in cheek (see Husserl, 
1989, pp. 103–104). The ego is an ineluctable focus 
of intentionality, a perpetual orientation of attention, 
perception, feeling, and cognition directed toward the 
world of experience (Husserl, 1969, p. 23). A meditator 
inevitably comes to this conclusion because she or he 
finds that every content one focuses upon as “me”—as 
“my” self—is impermanent; that is, all contents arise and 
pass away within the sphere of consciousness; hence, the 
old Sufi saw: you can’t step in the same river twice. All that 
remains of “my” self is an enduring point of view always 
present within the stream of consciousness, a point of 
view that is devoid of permanent content, and yet is 
identical to the unity of each moment of consciousness 
(see Husserl, 1970, p. 545).
Meditation and the Neural-Self
What one is able to learn from the maturation 
of awareness reported by advanced meditators fits well 
with how the neurosciences describe how the brain 
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develops consciousness. Insight meditation of any kind 
is essentially the disciplined turning of the spotlight 
of consciousness upon the internal processes of the 
transcendental self. It is clear now from research on 
the neuropsychology of meditation that the process of 
introspection is one that involves a reorganization of 
the neural-self (Davidson, 1976; Damasio, 2003, 2010; 
Deshmukh, 2006; Luders, Clark, & Toga, 2011; Luders 
et al., 2012; Shapiro & Walsh, 1984; Varela, Thompson, 
& Rosch, 1991; Varela & Shear, 1999; Xu et al., 2014). 
Moreover, this picture is consistent with Carl Jung’s 
insistence that when one takes an active role in one’s own 
individuation (maturation of the psyche), one ends up a 
qualitatively different person than if one’s individuation 
unfolds unconsciously (see e.g., Jung, 1967, paragraph 
241).
A self-aware neural-self is different both 
experientially and structurally than a non-aware 
self or empirical ego. Indeed, neuropsychologically 
speaking, awareness of self is mediated differently than 
awareness of the Other (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). 
The introspective mind-state is mediated by a discrete 
organization in the brain (Heatherton et al., 2006), and 
as that system of networks develops through repetitive 
application of self-awareness, the introspective faculty 
grows, strengthens, and reorganizes (Goldberg, Harel, 
& Malach, 2006; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & 
Raichle, 2001; Murphy & Donovan, 1999).  As more 
is learned about how the brain mediates its own self-
reflection , there is a concomitant and growing realization 
among researchers of the value of introspective, 
phenomenological, and meditative research in science 
(Tart, 2001; Wallace, 2007, 2009). 
Parenthetically, clinical psychologists have 
studied an interesting syndrome that seems relevant 
to the neural underpinnings of no-self—so called 
depersonalization syndrome (Sierra, 2009). The condition 
has its roots in early childhood, and onset after middle-
age is rare. It appears to be a consequence of childhood 
anxiety (Lee, Kwok, Hunter, Richards, & David, 2012), 
and there is no generally recognized treatment for the 
disorder. Normal children and young adults may also 
experience recurrent episodes of depersonalization. 
Moreover, researchers have experimentally induced 
the state in normal subjects using the drug flumazenil, 
a GABAA receptor antagonist (Cerqueira, Hallak, 
Crippa, & Nardi, 2012). Depersonalization is a disorder 
experienced as a detachment of awareness from emotions 
(sometimes referred to as a numbing of emotions) and 
the sensorium (sensory experience being, as it were, at 
a distance and unreal; sense of disembodiment). Brain 
imaging studies have shown that there is no damage to 
sensorium or limbic structures leading to the suggestion 
that depersonalization is a state of dissociation of 
the awareness structures of the brain from those 
mediating the senses and feelings. In studies in which 
normal subjects were given repeated electrical shocks, 
the subjects reported distinct depersonalization—a 
phenomenological remove from sensorial experience—
and this was accompanied by a dramatic flattening of 
sympathetic nervous system reactivity (Oswald, 1959). 
The best guess at present, based upon neural imaging 
studies, is that depersonalization is mediated by prefrontal 
cortical structures mediating awareness that disassociate 
themselves from emotional and sensory inputs—that is, 
they inhibit lower areas such as the insula and amygdala. 
It is also significant that the degree of severity of specific 
symptoms like de-realism, threatened self, panic attacks 
and the like will vary across cultures, and is especially 
related to individualist vs. collectivist constructions of 
the self (Sierra & David, 2007). It is entirely possible 
that the mechanisms responsible for depersonalization 
are active in the realization of no-self, as well as other 
meditation-related transpersonal experiences, although 
the motivation would be entirely different. As Castillo 
(1991) has noted for the practice of Hindu yoga:
Yogis experience themselves as dual entities. 
That is, they have two coconscious selves—a self 
participating in the world, and an uninvolved 
observing self—both aware of each other. To yogis 
this is experienced as "true renunciation"—that is, 
the renunciation of the participating self through 
identification with the observing self. This subjective 
experience serves to illustrate the power of culture in 
the constitution of experience and behavior. (p. 1)
It is also significant that as reorganization of the 
neural-self progresses, direct experience may produce 
dissonance relative to culturally received categories and 
local models of self and consciousness. Indeed, as Murphy 
and Throop (2010) have shown, received categories 
may become fuzzy in the extreme in order to remain 
adaptive to changing experience and neuropsychological 
maturation (see also Kosko, 1993; Laughlin, 1993; Rosch, 
1978). For example, in many cultures it is difficult and 
perhaps even irrelevant to make crisp distinctions among 
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alternative states of consciousness. For instance, Barbara 
Herr (1981, p. 334) has described the fuzzy boundaries 
Fijians draw between what in Western psychology are 
called dream, hallucination, and vision. Bill Merrill 
(1992) has described similar fuzziness of such categories 
among the Ramámiru people of Mexico. 
A crisp distinction between dreaming and 
meditation becomes moot as well in the experience of 
advanced meditators in Western society. For instance, 
RM, a close friend of mine and one of the most advanced 
meditators I have known, shared this dream sequence 
with me:
I am looking down a long ramp. It is bright daylight, 
a blue white light. Attractive females appear before 
me beckoning me down the slope. I know these 
women, but not by name. They call me on, then 
as I get close they fade and another appears. The 
pace is slow and deliberate, no hurry. The sequence 
eventually fades to light.
 A few nights later, I had another dream in which 
I enter a large space, like a gym, no ornaments or 
distractions. Ahead, I see an older man playing 
basketball with a few young boys, and I walk up 
to them. The older master notices me approaching 
and asks “are you interested?” I don’t need to answer 
verbally, it is understood, I am interested. He leads 
me to a side room. I sit, and he holds up a platter 
of small objects. I am to choose one. The master 
moves the platter to my forehead, and I am led to 
choose a small black bowl. The third eye is now fully 
open with light streaming. The master’s voice says 
“you have chosen death.” Everything dissolves into 
light and I am aware now of moving from a lucid 
dream state into fully conscious meditation with 
full concentration and at one with the universe, 
samadhi. The meditation now had its focus, or koan, 
the question had been answered. Calm, peaceful, 
abiding. To be reborn or to redefine ourselves, we 
need to experience the death of the self. We need to 
leave behind the constructs that impede our ability 
to see the true nature of mind.
The “true nature of mind” to which RM alluded is in 
part the inherent impermanence of any and all content 
in the stream of consciousness, including anything that 
might correspond to a fixed, enduring soul, ego, self, 
or identity.  This does not mean that all of the feelings, 
perceptions, self-concepts, habits, and so forth that 
used to define the “me” somehow magically vanish. 
The sequelae of realizing no-self really involve a years-
long process of disengagement from and identification 
with those mental factors. What falls away is the belief 
that there exists a single seamless person, a permanent 
“me,” that is at the center of all this mental and 
physical conditioning. What does remain is Husserl’s 
transcendental ego (see above), the inevitable pure 
subjectivity in each moment of consciousness.
Stream-Entry
The penultimate experience in Theravada Buddhist vipassana meditation is sotāpatti (stream-entry) 
or nirodha-samapattî (cessation). A meditator who has 
attained stream-entry is called a sotāpanna, or stream-
winner. In Japanese Zen, this experience is called 
satori or kenshō. Whatever term used, this experience is 
considered to be the first conscious absorption into and 
realization of Nirvana (see Amaro & Pasanno, 2009; 
Bodhi, 1999; Khema, 1994; Thanissaro, 2012a, 2012b). 
The Samye-Ling Retreat
My own experience of stream-entry occurred in 
1982 toward the end of a two month retreat at Kagyu 
Samye Ling Tibetan Buddhist meditation center in 
southern Scotland. At the beginning of the retreat I 
was alternating two types of meditation, one being a 
Tibetan Tantric meditation upon a deity known as 
Khorlo Demchog, a standing, blue, fierce, male figure 
embracing the red female deity Dorje Pakmo in sexual 
union while they dance together in flames. I was not using 
the complex instructions (sadhana) for the construction 
of the image of the deities. I was simply working from 
a photograph of the scene and internalizing it until I 
was able to evoke the eidetic image at will and in detail 
without the picture (another kind of kasn.a practice; see 
above). 
With this retreat my consciousness seemed to 
have “learned set” (as Harry Harlow used to say) and 
the visualization meditation developed far more rapidly 
than during previous occasions. After a period of days, 
the Demchog/Dorje Pakmo imagery took on a life of 
its own and the meditation no longer required evoking 
the eidetic image. The dancing couple would pop up 
and move around my sensorium performing different 
positions and movement that became meaningful to me 
at an intuitive level. The imagery was never so strong 
that I could hallucinate the imagery with my eyes open. 
The imagery was more like a dream or vision. 
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Because I was heavily influenced by C. G. Jung, 
I had always assumed that male and female deities in 
sexual union (yab-yum) were a symbolic representation 
of the male and female aspects of my own unconscious. 
Their movements, interactions, postures, and so forth 
communicated to me what the relationship between my 
male and female (the latter my anima, as Jung called 
the cross-sex aspect of the male psyche; see Laughlin, 
2001) processes were up to in the moment. The dancing 
imagery became more and more autonomous, and I 
became more and more comfortable with the meditation 
taking its own course. Eventually, the imagery began to 
simplify and the humanoid imagery transformed into 
two spheres of light (bindus, in Buddhist terms; Tibetan: 
thig le), one blue and the other rose, that danced (moved, 
circled) around each other, sometimes separating, 
sometimes merging, sometimes one bigger than the 
other. Sometime later a much smaller third sphere would 
appear between the blue and rose spheres, usually a 
golden color. I interpreted the appearance of the third 
sphere as representative of my self-awareness (or watcher), 
identifying neither with the male nor the female aspect. 
After a period of days, if I tried to construct the 
eidetic image of Demphog/Dorje Pakmo, the spheres 
would immediately pop up to take their place in the 
sensorium. I was no longer able to hold a complex yab-yum 
image of any kind without an immediate transformation 
of the imagery to spontaneous bindu imagery—a 
process I have learned to interpret as simplification 
and purification of countersigns (patibhaganimitta; see 
above). Interestingly, the bindus became permanent. To 
this day, some thirty-plus years later, all I have to do is 
close my eyes and concentrate on the inner screen of the 
visual sensorium and the bindus appear, and their activity 
reflects the state of my consciousness at the moment. At 
some point in this retreat I realized how the so called yin-
yang symbol may have originated in the direct experience 
of ancient Chinese contemplatives. 
The second type of meditation I used during 
the Samye-Ling retreat was mindfulness of the breath 
(ānāpānasmr.ti), as taught in Theravada Buddhism. I 
would either focus my attention upon the breath entering 
and leaving a nostril, or follow the breath down to the 
pit of my stomach and then lodge my focus on one of 
the chakras along the central channel as I imagined it 
to be, just forward of my spine. I would often visualize 
a tiny pea-sized blue bubble (bindu) with a Buddha 
figure in it moving up or down the central channel, or 
situated in a chakra.7 I used the breath concentration to 
deepen the calm and increase the concentration that I 
was using in the yab-yum work. Meanwhile, there were 
other interesting experiences going on as well, especially 
while dreaming (see Laughlin, 2011, Chap. 13 for more 
details). These were directly related to the core work of the 
two alternating meditations I planned to do throughout 
the retreat.
However, as the two previously distinct 
meditations developed—or, perhaps more accurately, 
as my consciousness developed during the course of 
the meditations—they merged into a single exercise of 
awareness that led eventually to stream-entry. Whether 
beginning with the yab-yum, or the breathing meditation, 
I quickly would reach the state of access concentration 
(upacara samadhi; see above). In that state I had the 
choice of meditating upon any aspect of consciousness to 
the exclusion of all else. The instructions one receives in 
Buddhist meditation training (so-called pith instructions) 
is that regardless of what the original meditation, once 
access concentration is reached and stabilized, the focus 
of concentration should shift to the arising and passing of 
phenomena. I followed this instruction assiduously, and 
as the retreat proceeded, more and more time was spent 
in this state and upon this focus. I had realized some time 
before the retreat that if sufficient concentration were 
focused upon an object or other aspect of phenomena, an 
absorption experience would likely arise. As I have said 
above, in access concentration, the mature contemplative 
can choose to enter or avoid absorption (the jhānas; see 
above)—using absorption and its numinous qualities to 
energize the main focus of meditation, whatever that 
may be.
Stream-Entry
The constant, unremitting, and concentrated 
focus of awareness upon arising and passing in access 
concentration was usually upon the field on sensorial 
particles, and the residue of the two types of meditation 
had simplified into a choice between concentrating on 
the blue and rose spheres and what they were telling me 
about the mind-state at the moment, or subtly shifting 
focus to the arising and passing of the particles that made 
up the sensorium in all modes (visual, auditory, tactile, 
somaesthetic, feelings, so forth), including constituting 
the spheres. I spent most of the time for days opting to 
focus on the arising and passing of these sensory dots. 
Eventually a sudden realization arose (instantaneous 
intuition) that there was actually no arising, and that 
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the entire sensorium was passing. From that moment 
my meditation focused upon the passing of the field 
of sensorial particles. This shift in awareness, be it 
ever so subtle, led within hours to stream-entry. One 
moment I was concentrating on the passing of sensorial 
dots, the next the entire sensorium fell away like a vast 
cosmic “dump” and all that remained was diamond-
clear awareness with no sensory field whatever. The 
experience must have been momentary, but during its 
duration there was no sense of time, no sense of space, 
no arising or passing of phenomena, no thoughts, no 
feelings, no movement, no desires or aversions, no 
choice, no coming or going—total liberation from 
the tyranny of phenomena over consciousness. The 
experience is ineffable simply because the only way to 
describe it to others is by way of metaphors, which of 
course are drawn from the experience of phenomena. 
There is no way to speak of Nirvana, save by the use of 
words that connote sensory objects or concepts. Even 
the word Nirvana itself is a metaphor, meaning to blow 
out the flames of desire and aversion. For that duration 
there was not a scintilla of phenomenal reality. There is 
just what I would call pure awareness with only itself 
as object. 
The moments following stream-entry were 
filled with inexpressible joy, for with the memory of 
the experience was simultaneous comprehension of its 
significance—that I had won through to the essence of 
mind, that I had realized sotāpatti (Mahāsi Sayādaw, 
1994) Very soon after this realization, within minutes 
as I recall, I understood completely why the masters 
taught that three fetters automatically fall away as a 
consequence of one’s first experience of stream-entry 
(see, e.g., Thanissaro, 2012b): (1) belief that I exist 
as a permanent phenomenon (for me this had largely 
fallen away earlier; see above), (2) doubt about the goal 
of Buddhist meditation, and (3) belief that rituals or 
other practices are the goal of the path to liberation. 
As the Alagaddupama Sutta notes, “In the Dhamma 
[the Buddha’s teachings] thus well-proclaimed by me—
clear, open, evident, stripped of rags—those monks 
who have abandoned the three fetters, are all stream-
winners, steadfast, never again destined for states of 
woe, headed for self-awakening” (Thanissaro, 2004). 
From my experience of the moments just following 
stream-entry, I had acquired apodictic knowledge of 
what constitutes the goal of Buddhadharma, and that 
any practice that does not aid in attaining stream-entry 
is false and a hindrance to the path. I also understood 
the truth of the words one of my teachers, Namgyal 
Rinpoche, had said to me, “Complex meditations are 
for dull minds.”
Consequences of Stream-Entry
There have been for me numerous consequences 
of the experience of stream-entry—usually summarized 
as the fruits of stream-entry (Sanskrit: sotāpatti phala). 
For one thing, I came to understand that realization 
of sensorial dots is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for stream-entry. All that is absolutely required 
is the ability to enter access concentration and tenacious 
concentration upon the arising and passing, and then 
the passing of phenomena. Others would seem to have 
experienced stream-entry in something like the way I 
did. For instance, Ekaku Hakuin (2010) wrote that: 
“At around midnight on the seventh and final night of 
my practice, the boom of a bell from a distant temple 
reached my ears: suddenly, my body and mind dropped 
completely away. I rose clear of even the finest dust. 
Overwhelmed with joy” (p. 23). In addition, Robert 
Bellah (2008) related the experience of an eighteenth 
century Zen monk and teacher, Ishida Baigan, who, 
after meditating for years, had this experience:
Late one night, he lay down exhausted, and was 
unaware of the break of day. He heard the cry of a 
sparrow in the woods behind where he was lying. 
Then within his body it was like the serenity of a 
great sea or a cloudless sky. He felt the cry of that 
sparrow like a cormorant diving and entering the 
water, in the serenity of a great sea. After that he 
abandoned the conscious observation of his own 
nature. (pp.201–202)
For another thing, meditation for me boiled down 
to whatever work I have had to do to become centered 
and tranquil enough to enter access concentration, and 
then to focus upon the passing of phenomena. This 
work has continued to mature in very subtle ways. Very 
recently I came close to entering the stream for a second 
time, an event that is called phalasamapatti, or attainment 
of fruition (Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994, p. 34). This occurs 
when the knowledge of Nirvana, or the stream (the 
cognitive fruits), has matured sufficiently that one may 
re-enter the stream with greater awareness than the first 
time, and without aversive reactions that will hinder the 
letting go into the stream (Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994). This 
happened for me in this way:
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I became lucid in a dream in which I was meditating 
(I believe I was in a temple of some kind) and 
turned my attention to the passing away of dream 
phenomena. So intense did the concentration 
become that I was no longer dreaming, but was 
in access concentration watching the field of dots 
that constituted hypnopompic imagery, and then 
the field of dots alone without form—the imagery 
had fallen away. At a particular moment, I realized 
I was headed back into stream—I recognized the 
symptoms as the field of dots began to “dump” so 
that all that remained before the mind’s eye was 
rapidly passing sensorial dots. My foreknowledge of 
the experience of entering stream, which had been 
absent when I experienced sotāpatti, got in the way 
of letting go. At the last moment there was a small 
but sufficient aversive reaction to stop the process 
leading to phalasamapatti. 
Despite having hindered the process of letting go into 
the stream, I experienced intense joy and after some 
moments realized that, while my clinging to phenomenal 
reality was still too strong to allow the experience a 
second time, the bonds are weakening and I am getting 
closer. I also realized that it is only that aversion, that 
clinging to phenomena (or form; Mahāsi Sayādaw, 1994, 
p. 34), that stands in the way of my being able to enter 
the stream at will, and remaining there if I chose.
Within a week or so of leaving Samye-Ling for 
the United States, some of the other consequences of 
stream-entry began to present themselves, some of them 
in the dream state. One particularly memorable dream 
occurred while I was staying in Philadelphia:
I dreamed that I was standing hand in hand with 
my child self under a fiery arch that had morphed 
from two enormous serpents that had arisen on each 
side of us and touched their heads above us.  I was 
lucid and watching the scene from a position behind 
the fiery portal and my dream selves, so I could 
see they were located on a vast plain upon which 
stood the ruins of a city.  I knew in the dream that 
I was looking at the transformation of myself after 
the realizations of the past [Samye-Ling] retreat. I 
was beginning to awaken from the dream and was 
in a hypnopompic state when a fiery golden chariot 
being drawn by huge golden horses appeared out 
of an intense, almost blinding golden light, and a 
deep, booming voice called out, "Read Ezekiel!" 
This image could not have lasted more than a few 
seconds, but I awoke knowing that I had not (and 
indeed have never since) experienced a dream like 
that. (Laughlin, 2011, p. 191–192)
I did not own a Bible and did not recall ever 
reading the book of Ezekiel, although I might have 
encountered the fiery chariot motif in my childhood 
Methodist bible classes. I obtained a copy of the Old 
Testament later that same day and was astonished when 
I read of God appearing before the prophet in the form 
of a fiery chariot pulled by Chayot (mystical angels), and 
that much of the book was about the destruction of the 
old Jerusalem and the construction of the City of God 
upon its ashes. I also noted that the creatures pulling 
the chariot in my dream were definitely horses, and not 
the mythical angels of the Biblical imagery. This dream 
happened over thirty years ago, and it is still as clear, 
numinous and meaningful to me today as it was then. 
For me, this was clearly an indication that the stream-
entry experience was resulting in transformations at a 
very deep level of my psyche. 
Discussion
Turning the subjectivity of transpersonal experiences into publically available, scientifically useful data 
is sometimes not an easy thing to accomplish (Rock 
& Laughlin, 2014). I once addressed this issue as the 
“problem of the phenomenological typewriter;” namely, 
presuming that ethnographers, by means of participant 
observation, successfully attain the experiences intended 
by mythic drama, ordeal, drug trip, ritual and other 
methods of an alien culture's religion, how then do they 
describe those experiences so that they become publicly 
available data (Laughlin, 1989)? As an anthropologist, 
my commitment has been first and foremost to science—
to grounding experiential anthropology in a Jamesian 
“radical empiricism,” if you will (James, 1912/1976; 
Laughlin & McManus, 1995; Taylor, 1996). By that 
I mean that no experience had by human beings from 
whatever cultural background is too outré to be included 
as data under scientific scrutiny. 
Ineffability and Poetics
The rarer the experience (a commonplace in 
the study of mystical and transpersonal experiences), 
the harder it is to render the information gleaned from 
the experience into a scientifically comparative form. 
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All too often the description of a rare experience is 
set aside as somehow too anecdotal to be considered 
scientific. This is especially true in the present case, for 
any attempt to describe “path moment” (sotāpatti) in 
natural language will perforce require that one resort 
to similes and metaphors—even the terms “path” and 
“moment,” “stream” and “enter”, are similes. Indeed, 
with respect to the direct experience of sotāpatti, there is 
no path, no stream, no entering, no time-consciousness, 
no space (thus the term “empty” is also just a simile)—in 
fact phenomenally speaking, there is no anything save 
awareness .
Always keeping in mind that there is no such 
thing as an experience that admits of one and only one 
interpretation, one nonetheless develops a basis in 
transpersonal experiences for understanding how 
particular metaphors come to stand for what are largely 
ineffable states. Take for instance anthropologist, Carol 
Laderman’s (1988, 1993) experience while researching 
Malay shamanic healing. She found that Malays were 
reluctant to talk about their experiences of the “Inner 
Winds” that arise during ritual trance states. “They 
told me that the only way I could know would be to 
experience it myself” (1988, p. 805). Eventually, her 
teacher led her through a ritual that resulted in her 
entering a trance state. “At the height of my trance, I 
felt the Wind blowing inside my chest with the strength 
of a hurricane” (1988, p. 806; emphasis added). When 
she described this experience to her informants, they 
responded with comments like, “Why do you think we 
call them Winds?”
This issue has been tellingly addressed by 
anthropological poetics (aka ethnopoetics; see Brady, 1991; 
Diamond, 1986; Hymes, 2003; Tedlock, 1999), a field 
that studies the many ways language is molded to express 
experiences across cultures—“...focusing in particular on 
the oral communication of proverbs, laments, prayers, 
praises, prophecies, curses, and riddles shaped by the 
spoken, chanted, or singing voice” (Brady, 2008, p. 296). 
Actually, all experiences are ineffable in that more is left 
out than can be expressed. Another way to say this is that 
while experiences are information rich, cognition and 
language are relatively information poor. The problem 
in communication is for the speaker to send sufficient 
information—the right information—to trigger (or 
“penetrate to”) a much larger field of information in 
the mind of the hearer (Laughlin, 1989). The challenge 
is even greater with communicating transpersonal 
experiences such as those I have described here. As most 
societies are to some extent polyphasic, people who have 
extraordinary experiences face the challenge of finding 
a language to share the subjective, and express the 
expressible. They often have recourse to poetics, which 
in all likelihood was the first and oldest art form, for 
it allowed the sharing of not only sensory aspects of 
alternative states of consciousness, but also intuitive 
knowledge. The Buddha himself reputedly used poetry to 
communicate such knowledge. The Udana (included in 
the Sutta Pitaka) is partly in verse, one of which expresses 
a consequence of Awakening (Buddha, 1997, Ud 2):
When things become manifest
To the ardent meditating Brahmin ,
All his doubts then vanish since he has known
The utter destruction of conditions.
The Buddha’s verse does not express a rational 
conclusion that because the conditions causing 
phenomena have been de-structured, one therefore 
logically concludes her doubts about the path were 
unfounded. Rather, it is an expression of the fact that 
with the first stream-entry experience, doubt about the 
path automatically drops away. It is an intuitive knowing 
that may give rise to poetic expression via imagination, 
metaphor and insight. Poetics is  born of the challenge 
of expressing and sharing the ineffable. All societies have 
their poetic forms for just this purpose. Yet in modern 
technocratic societies, a schism has been erected between 
poetic expression and science. This humanist-scientist 
dichotomy stands as a hindrance to doing transpersonal 
science, for it fails to rise to the challenge of sharing the 
most effective uses of esoteric language as scientifically 
useful data. Yet there is no reason (other than ideological 
loyalty) that transpersonal researchers cannot embrace 
what my friend and colleague, Ivan Brady calls artful 
science—a methodology that is grounded in the media 
of poetics. Specifically addressing anthropologists, Brady 
(2005) notes that artful science:
...pursues knowledge mostly ignored or formally 
discounted by the extremes of logical positivism. It 
advocates as a complement (not as a replacement) to 
a kind of knowing and reporting that (a) promotes 
phenomenology as a philosophy that puts the 
observer (the seeker, the knower) upfront in the 
equation of interpreting and representing experience; 
(b) pushes interpretive anthropology back into the 
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loop of sensual experience, a body-centered position 
that includes a consideration of but transcends the 
sweeping metaphor that everything (e.g., people, 
landscapes) can and should be rendered as texts 
to be interpreted; (c) finds some continuity in the 
structures and orientations of body-roundedness 
and myth despite important limitations posed by 
language itself and by epistemic interference between 
the present and our preliterate past; and (d) gives 
poets special cachet through their offering forms of 
knowing and saying (robust metaphors and more) 
that can engage the senses and visions of being-in-
place in ways that both exceed and complement 
more conventional strategies in anthropology and 
history. (pp. 981–982)
This approach is especially useful for transpersonal 
researchers interested in understanding the religious art 
and architecture of prehistoric peoples, as well as the 
textual expressions of transpersonal experiences by long 
dead literate peoples.
More on Methods
Thus far there are no technological methods 
that may independently measure the activity of the 
brain while, say, an arhat (Pali: arahant; a person who 
is never apart from the stream; indeed may be said to be 
one with the stream) is absorbed in Nirvana. She cannot 
take a camera with her and record the experience. She 
cannot tape record her description of the experience as it 
occurs. She cannot draw or paint the experience in other 
than metaphorical terms. Most importantly, we do not 
know how the brain mediates stream-entry. Is sotāpatti 
mediated by isolating prefrontal cortical attention 
structures from the structures mediating the sensorium? 
Or does the sensorium simply cease to function for the 
duration of the experience, leaving in its wake something 
like “pure” consciousness, consciousness with only itself 
as object? We do not yet know. We do have a literature 
pertaining to the psychology of post-stream-entry 
sotāpanna. For example, Full, Walach, & Trautwein 
(2013) interviewed advanced Burmese Theravadā 
Buddhist meditators who presumably had experienced 
stream-entry in order to establish whether meditation at 
this level of maturity leads to significant and permanent 
changes in perception. They found: “Changes could be 
identified concerning the quality of perception, especially 
in aspects of clarity; comprehension of interdependences 
in perception processing, i.e., mental condition and 
perception; successive cessation of a subject/object-based 
perception; and finally, a nonconceptual perception 
including the deconstruction of the notion of I, self, 
or me” (Full, Walach, & Trautwein, 2013, p. 61). But 
the authors caution that their study could not parse-out 
cultural conditioning that may have influenced their 
data. I would add that being labeled a sotāpanna may in 
some cases be due to status factors in Burmese monastic 
culture—a way of acknowledging advanced status as a 
meditator or teacher—and is not a guarantee that the 
individual has actually experienced stream-entry. Again, 
there is as yet no independent method of measuring 
stream-winners.
Obviously there is also no way to draw a random 
sample from a known universe of stream-winners among 
all peoples everywhere. Thus the use of parametric 
statistics in analyzing the data from a non-random 
sample of stream winners, even when available (as in the 
study above) would be invalid. Does that mean that the 
study of rare states of consciousness cannot in principle be 
“scientific?” Hardly. To require quantitative experimental 
evidence in such cases would amount to the most absurd 
kind of scientism, one that denies the foundations of 
all scientific disciplines in naturalistic research. By such 
an account, most of Darwin’s work aboard the Beagle 
would not make the grade. In fact, as William James 
argued, much can be empirically learned from individual 
experiential case studies, and trait comparisons between 
such studies, even when the experiences are rare and 
the universe of such cases remains unknown. The great 
neurologist, V. S. Ramachandran addressed this issue in 
the following way: “By way of analogy, imagine that I 
cart a pig into your living room and tell you that it can 
talk. You might say, ‘Oh really? Show me.’ I then wave 
my wand and the pig starts talking. You might respond, 
‘My God! That’s amazing!’ You are not likely to say, 
‘Ah, but that’s just one pig. Show me a few more and 
then I might believe you’” (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 
1999, p. xiii). Neuroscience,8 as with transpersonal 
studies, is grounded in single case studies; often in-depth 
qualitative explorations upon which later multiple case 
meta-analyses are founded.
Developmental Perspective
If there is a single lesson I have drawn from 
reflecting on the signal experiences I have had over the 
course of a lifetime of meditation, it is that the processes 
of neuropsychological development are pivotal to both 
spiritual awakening and transpersonal studies. Even when 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 29Sensory Dots, No-Self, and Stream-Entry
ethnographers appreciate the cultural significance of 
transpersonal experiences and even leave themselves open 
to having such experiences themselves (imbibing the 
host’s entheogens, or religiously important psychotropic 
drugs, participating in the local healing and other rituals 
that evoke extraordinary experiences, or in the present 
case, taking on the process of meditation), they have all 
too often failed to realize that transpersonal experiences 
may occur for their hosts in a developmental continuum 
from, say, those associated with initiation early in 
life to those typical to elder masters and shamans (see 
Assagioli, 2007; Chinen, 1985; Wilber, 1996). In other 
words, spiritual paths are developmental processes with 
various experiences marking way points along the path 
to full maturation. An American learning to become 
a lucid dreamer, for instance, is a far cry from being a 
dream shaman. In spiritual awakening, transpersonal 
experiences may be both symptomatic of one’s level of 
maturity, and the cause for a change in self-understanding.
With respect to the Buddhist path, my old 
friend and meditation teacher, Tarchin Hearn has noted 
(personal communication, 8 May 2014):
Many people can apprentice in a spiritual system 
and become adepts and teachers of that tradition. 
Not so many people can as a result of their practice, 
transcend or go beyond the very tradition that 
nourished them.  Buddhism teaches us how to live 
well in the present moment.  It doesn't know what 
will unfold in the moment to come.  This universe has 
not yet arisen.  Namgyal Rinpoche once suggested 
to me that I should study Buddhism, realize it and 
walk on and then I should study Western traditions, 
realize them and walk on.  I've come to realize that 
the “walking on” is the forefront of this evolving 
universe in the collaborative act (with everything 
and everyone else) of creative being.  Put in another 
way, when I was young I thought that I needed 
to understand and perhaps even master Buddhist 
teaching.  I had no idea that Buddhist teaching was 
an attempt to skillfully nudge me towards a way of 
being and a field of questioning that, at the time, 
I was not able to even imagine and that today I 
discover hour by hour.
Numerous ethnographers have worked among 
peoples with polyphasic cultures. Relatively few of them 
have gone so far as to participate in a culture to the extent 
of attaining the alternative states that ground each of the 
host's worldviews. This is the common pattern among 
ethnographers who have studied shamanistic religions, 
many of which require initiation into the proper use 
of entheogens and secret ritual practices, a process of 
apprenticeship that may last for years (see the articles by 
Robin Rodd, an ethnographer who has apprenticed to a 
South American shaman; Rodd, 2002, 2006; Rodd & 
Sumabila, 2011). There are cases in which the society’s 
mythological system may reflect a developmental 
progression of understanding and realization from the 
simple levels of childhood through to the comprehension 
of the master. For instance, Dan Jorgensen (1980) 
discovered that the mythology of the Telefolmin people 
of Papua New Guinea have something on the order of 
ten distinct levels of complexity ranging from many 
short “just-so” stories for children to a master’s level in 
which all the many myths are integrated into a single 
story that takes days to narrate.
The course of meditational maturation—
of meditative individuation, to wax Jungian for a 
moment—is perhaps one of the most empirically 
available, because more and more dedicated meditators 
have become what the late Eugene d’Aquili and I liked 
to call mature contemplatives (d'Aquili, Laughlin, & 
McManus, 1993; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 
1990, Chap. 11). We now have sufficient evidence from 
psychological and neuroscience research supporting the 
notion that meditation results in changes in perception, 
attention, affect, and cognition (see Baron Short et al., 
2010; Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti 2011; Garland, Gaylord, 
Boettiger, & Howard,  2010; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 
2007; MacLean et al., 2010; Murphy & Donovan, 1999; 
Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). It also seems 
very likely, as suggested by Ledi (2007), that most really 
significant changes in neurophysiological, psychological, 
and cognitive functions caused by meditation will be 
found among mature contemplatives. For instance, it 
is far easier for me to enter access concentration now 
than when I first experienced it so many years ago. Still, 
I am unable to access that state at will, a skill that is 
prerequisite for an arhat, which I am decidedly not. 
Notice that when I got close to a second absorption 
into the stream (phalasamapatti), there was sufficient 
aversion to letting go of phenomena to thwart the 
process. What I learned from this “near miss” is that my 
“clinging” to phenomena—to sensorial productions—
and my emotional reaction to sudden transformations in 
consciousness have not matured sufficiently to allow the 
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crystals, skrying bowls thrown on the ground, starlight 
passing through a crystal, images in a skrying bowl, and 
so forth. Of course, there is no way to know for sure 
when shamanism first became linked with meditation 
practices (Lewis-Williams, 1997).
A pivotal distinction must be made here: 
Whereas most shamanic meditation practices very likely 
involved following and interacting with dynamic imagery 
in much the same way that C. G. Jung advocated in his 
method of active imagination (see Jung, 1997; Von Franz, 
1997[1979]), Hannah, 1981), Buddhist mindfulness 
discourages interacting with imagery, except in Tantric 
traditions where more shamanic methods are used solely 
to energize the real work of mindfulness training, the 
realization of stream-entry, and cessation of phenomena. 
Keep in mind that the Buddha considered clinging 
to (dialoguing with) phenomena was a major cause 
of suffering (dukkha), and he wished to discover the 
“builder”9 of phenomena by snuffing out this clinging 
and thereby embracing cessation (Rahula, 1974). As far 
as I know, no known shamanic tradition is founded upon 
the realization, or even the knowledge of stream-entry. 
But again, for the methodological reasons mentioned 
above, we simply cannot know for sure.
Husserlian and Buddhist Methods
As noted above, I recognized many parallels 
between Buddhist mindfulness practices and Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, I early on 
suspected that Edmund Husserl was to some extent what 
Buddhist psychology calls a pratyekabuddha, or “self-
awakener.” This is someone who is so sufficiently advanced 
in mindfulness that they rediscover the development 
of the path of awakening all by themselves with no 
instructions or teachers. It was clear to me that using 
either Buddhist mindfulness or Husserlian “reduction” 
would inevitably lead one into the same transpersonal 
domains of self-awareness (Hanna, 1993b), and lead 
to the most accurate phenomenological understanding 
of consciousness. Moreover, considering Husserl as a 
pratyekabuddha seemed to me to explain why so many of 
his students and followers failed to “get it” with respect 
to actually attaining the phenomenological attitude and 
transpersonal comprehension. This failure is at the very 
core of Husserl’s disappointment with his protégé, Martin 
Heidegger, who ran off to teach university philosophy 
before becoming a mature contemplative (see Husserl, 
1997). Others of Husserl’s students (e.g., Eugene Fink, 
Gerhard Funke, Ludwig Landgrebe) did hang around 
experience to occur. The recognition of what was about 
to happen emotionally hindered the happening. I am able 
to project to a time when, should I live long enough, the 
emotional reaction will be either gone or of insufficient 
intensity to thwart another entry into the stream.
Origins and Pervasiveness of Meditation
Meditation—defined as the “sustained 
awareness aimed at nonreactive and nonattached 
mental observation, without cognitive or emotional 
interpretation of the unfolding moment-to-moment 
experience” (Braboszcz, Hahusseau, & Delorme, 2010, 
p. 1910)—is neither a recent phenomenon, nor was it 
first invented by Eastern spiritual traditions (Goleman, 
1996). Indeed, most of the classic meditations used by 
the Buddha in his teaching were inherited from traditions 
that were ancient even in his time (Gunaratana, 2002; 
Wynne, 2009). As C. G. Jung (as cited in Hannah, 
1981, p. 3) noted years ago, human beings have very 
likely been meditating for millennia—possibly as long as 
humans have been both self-aware, and able to share and 
discuss subjective experiences such as fantasies, visions, 
dreams, hallucinations, drug induced imagery, as well 
as meditative “countersigns”, and so forth. Of course we 
will never know the precise evolutionary Rubicon leading 
to a “meditative brain,” for, short of a time machine, this 
momentous event will remain a matter of speculation 
and theory (Filmer-Lorch, 2012, pp. 6–7). 
However, I would argue that prior to a certain 
point in prehistory, virtually all human cultures would 
have been polyphasic in their world view, grounded in 
their belief that experiences had in alternative states of 
consciousness are but different perspectives on reality 
(Laughlin, 2013). Many cultures would have discovered 
the practice of intense concentration upon images and 
other somatic phenomena available to their mind’s eye, 
and this perhaps widespread practice could well have 
influenced the evolution of certain cognitive functions 
(see Mithen, 2003; Rossano, 2007). Doubtless also, 
meditation of various types would have played a central 
role in ancient shamanic mysticism and healing (Lewis-
Williams, 1992, 1997; MacDonald , Cove, Laughlin, 
& McManus, 1987; Pearson, 2002, p. 95; Peters, 
1989; Winkelman, 2010, pp. 72–73). The fact that 
countersigns often arise as a consequence of intense 
concentration upon any object, it is suggestive that 
many shamanic healing traditions involve the healer 
or diagnostician meditating upon (“reading”) some 
pattern ; per example, bones, entrails, sandals, stones, 
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Husserl and did do the requisite mindfulness work, 
and their comprehension of, and reflections upon the 
phenomenological attitude are very useful to meditators 
wishing to understand Husserlian methods (see Fink, 
1995; Funke, 1987; Landgrebe, 1973).
At the time I was reading Husserl’s books, it 
was part of the English-speaking Husserlian zeitgeist 
that  he had not come into contact with Buddhism, or 
the Pali Canon, for he never mentions Buddhism in any 
of his major writings. Some scholars had acknowledged 
the similarities and differences between Husserlian 
phenomenology and various forms of Indian philosophy 
(e.g., Mohanty, 1972). Turns out, however, that Husserl 
did engage with the Buddhist literature—the Pali Canon 
had just been translated into German—and he even 
wrote a short note expressing his feelings about what 
he had read. Thanks to Fred Hanna (1995), we have an 
English translation of that 1925 note entitled “On the 
Teachings of Gotama [Gautama] Buddha.” In that note 
Husserl seems to thoroughly identify with the aims and 
methods of Buddhist phenomenology: 
That Buddhism—insofar as it speaks to us from 
pure original sources—is a religio-ethical discipline 
for spiritual purification and fulfillment of the 
highest stature—conceived of and dedicated to an 
inner result of a vigorous and unparalleled, elevated 
frame of mind, will soon become clear to every reader 
who devotes themselves to the work. [emphasis added] 
Buddhism is comparable only with the highest 
form of the philosophical and religious spirit of our 
European culture. It is now our task to utilize this 
(to us) completely new Indian spiritual discipline 
which has been revitalized and strengthened by this 
contrast. (as cited in Hanna, 1995, p. 367)
One important factor influencing my use 
of Husserlian methods was the simple fact that, 
coming from a wealth of experience while practicing 
Buddhist mindfulness (vipassana), Husserl’s methods 
of bracketing, “reduction,” the epoché, returning “to 
the things themselves,” etc., were perfectly transparent. 
Despite his turgid prose, it was blatantly obvious to me 
what Husserl’s project was about. I do not intend to get 
further into Husserlian methods here, because that would 
take us on another tangent—besides, my colleague Jason 
Throop and I have engaged in that discussion elsewhere 
(Laughlin & Throop, 2009). Suffice to say here, as Hanna 
(1995) wrote: “Eugen Fink once told Dorion Cairns 
‘that the various phases of Buddhistic self-discipline 
were essentially phases of phenomenological reduction’ 
(Cairns, 1976, p. 50). This statement is especially 
significant in light of the fact that Fink was Husserl’s 
chief assistant, and was considered by Husserl to be his 
most trusted interpreter” (Hanna, 1995, p. 366). It is thus 
also significant that Husserl considered the effort and 
dedication of attaining the phenomenological attitude 
results inevitably in psychological development. Again, 
as Hanna (1995) notes: “Husserl claimed side benefits 
of phenomenological seeing in terms of self-exploration 
and self-development. He said that the insights gained 
from performing the transcendental phenomenological 
method of seeing brings about ‘a complete personal 
transformation’ (Husserl, 1970[1936], p. 137)” (p.369).
There is one other important factor that I do 
need to emphasize, and that is, I can find no evidence 
that Husserl himself experienced stream-entry. His use 
of the concepts of “transcendental phenomenology” 
and “pure consciousness” refer more to something like 
access concentration, a state few of his students and 
followers apparently developed. His descriptions of 
that state involve the falling away of all preconceptions, 
all discursive knowledge, and a complete openness to 
intuitive insight. His project was fundamentally different 
than the Buddha’s in that Husserl wished to explore the 
essential structures of phenomenal consciousness, and 
was not guided into a course of meditation that would 
lead him, or any of his students so far as I know, to 
sotāpatti; that is, transcending phenomenal experience. 
Moreover, my hunch has always been that, given Husserl 
was perhaps a pratyekabuddha, he found it easier to enter 
access concentration without the disciplined calming 
and centering exercises (samatha) required by most of us 
to reach that state (see also Hanna, 1995, p. 371).
Conclusion
I have had numerous transpersonal experiences over the course of the last half-century of phenomenological 
exploration, especially while dreaming (see Laughlin 
2011, Chap. 13). What I have described above are three 
of the most seminal experiences arising during the course 
of mindfulness work—the realization of sensorial dots, 
of no-self, and of stream-entry. These three were not only 
real experiences, they were “seal” experiences, ones that 
resulted in permanent transformations in my perception, 
self-knowledge, and phenomenological insight. They 
are also understandable as way  stations along a path 
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of gradually developing, intuitive understanding of 
how consciousness works. I do not mean to imply that 
discerning sensorial dots or no-self are either necessary 
or sufficient conditions for attaining stream-entry (hence, 
a non-linear process). It is clear from the literature that 
steam-entry can be attained without either previous 
realizations having occurred. In those cases, the 
realization of no-self, if it has not occurred previously, is 
an inevitable consequence of stream-entry. Also, stream-
winners may never actually realize that all phenomena 
are “built” of sensorial dots. What I am able to say from 
my own experiences is that, in my case, one realization 
followed the other in a sequence that, in retrospect, 
appears to have been the result of a maturation of 
introspective view. What does seem to be a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for stream-entry is the 
maturation of access concentration, for only in that state 
will the consciousness be able to let go into the experience 
of absorption without being hindered by aversion.
My suspicion is that I came to realize 
sensorial dots and no-self independently of attaining 
stream-entry because I was working as much from a 
neurophenomenological perspective as from Buddhist 
mindfulness (Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990). 
What I was doing was bracketing processes that were 
integral to perception and interpretation. I also did this 
with respect to time-consciousness in a way that is not 
required in Buddhist mindfulness, but is fundamental to 
Husserlian phenomenology (Laughlin, 1992; Laughlin & 
Throop, 2008). Nonetheless, in retrospect, it is clear to me 
that one realization set me up for the next, and continues 
to do so in a complex process of phenomenologically-
oriented neurocognitive development.
Any subjective, “first-person” methodology is 
only useful for a science of consciousness if it produces 
reports that lead to further research. At the same time, 
and speaking in favor of radical empiricism, research 
based upon poor phenomenological descriptions will also 
produce poor science. As Dhananjay Chavan (2011) notes, 
Whatever may be one’s view of consciousness in the 
natural order, there is probably a need for systematic 
first-person methods to study our subjective mental 
states and correlate them to physical states (brain 
states) which can be empirically characterized. 
Given the bewildering variety and range of conscious 
mental states it seems unlikely that any methodical 
observation can be made of one’s subjectivity without 
proper training and grounding in formalized first-
person methods. (p. 248) 
This said, it is hard for me to visualize a method for 
studying the neuropsychological underpinnings of 
the sotāpatti experience, for it lasts but a moment, 
is unpredictable, and very likely cannot occur when 
the meditator is wired up or lying flat-out in a fMRI 
machine. But technological problems aside, this is no 
reason why the experience cannot be considered as 
scientifically relevant.
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3. The methodology used by the Buddha, termed 
vipassana, is nothing less than a phenomenology 
of mind. Indeed vipassana is ‘‘the first historical 
attempt to map the human mind in a thorough and 
realistic way without  admixture of metaphysics and 
mythology’’ (Nyanaponika Thera, 1998).
4. My first Buddhist meditation teacher was the 
Venerable Tarchin Gelong (aka Tarchin Hearn), 
an English born Canadian and an accomplished 
insight meditator, and my second was Tarchin’s own 
guru, Venerable Namgyal Rinpoche, who was also 
a Canadian born meditation master who had been 
recognized by the 16th Karmapa as a reincarnated 
tulku, or bodhisattva. I later went on to study under 
the great Sakya lama, Venerable Chogye Trichen 
Rinpoche, who was also my preceptor when I 
became a monk in the late 1970s at Lumbini, Nepal.
5. Husserl’s concept of the (or an) epoché derives from 
the Greek epoché, meaning suspension (Husserl 1931). 
A contemplative enacts an epoché every time she or 
he brackets” (isolates, distinguishes, highlights) 
some aspect of experience and quarantines it from 
influencing the outcome of self-study.
6. A kasin.a is a colored disk used to meditate on color 
or element. They are used to stimulate an eidetic 
image that becomes the real object of concentration 
(see Buddhaghosa, 1991; Zajonc, 2009, Chap. 4).
7. This is a variation of breathing concentration 
combined with visualization that I learned from a 
monk in Thailand, a member of the sangha at Wat 
Pak Nam temple in Bangkok.  Each monk carries a 
small clear marble enclosing  a golden Buddha figure 
which is used as a kasin.a. I have also used blue and 
red marbles as visualization devices.
8. Consider the impact of the strange case of Phineas 
Gage upon 19th century neuropsychology 
(Macmillan, 2000).
9. Verse 154 of the Dhammapada reads: Oh 
housebuilder! You are seen, you shall build no house 
again. All your rafters are broken, your roof-tree is 
destroyed. My mind has reached the unconditioned 
(Nibbana); the end of craving has been attained.
